



Home Office

# **London 2012**

## Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy

July 2009



A major factor in the decision to bring the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games to London was the commitment from the UK Government to ensure safety and security at every Olympic location and venue. The London Host City Contract includes commitments from:

- the **Prime Minister**, who signed a guarantee to ‘take all financial, planning and operational measures necessary to guarantee the safety and the peaceful celebration of the Games’;
- the **Home Secretary**, who guaranteed to ‘co-ordinate all matters of security and the emergency services for the Games’; and
- the **Chancellor of the Exchequer**, who signed a separate guarantee to provide ‘all necessary financial support to the Games, to include... bearing the costs of providing security’.

# Meeting the security challenge

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## Background

1. The Olympic and Paralympic Games will begin in London on 27 July 2012 and conclude on 9 September 2012. There will be 26 Olympic sports in 34 venues and 20 Paralympic sports in 21 venues across London and the UK. An estimated 9 million tickets are likely to be sold, and 27,500 members of the media are likely to attend. In March 2007, the Minister for the Olympics and the then Home Secretary agreed a funding envelope of £600 million to cover additional costs arising from safety and security.

2. This document sets out the vision, aim and objectives for a single Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy for the Government, the London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games (LOCOG), the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA), the police service and all other key delivery agencies. All contributing agencies, organisations and departments share the aims, objectives, planning principles and assumptions set out in this document.

## Accountability

3. Responsibility for **discharging** the guarantees made by the Prime Minister and Home Secretary rests with:

- the Ministerial Committee on Economic Development **Sub Committee on the Olympic and Paralympic Games** (ED(OPG)), which is responsible for co-ordinating and overseeing all issues relating to the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games;

- the **Ministerial Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development Sub-Committee on Protective Security and Resilience** (NSID(PSR)), which gives direction and, where appropriate, resolves issues relating specifically to the Safety and Security Strategy, monitors the delivery of the Safety and Security Programme and reports to ED(OPG) on progress;
- the **Minister for the Olympics**, who has direct responsibility for the delivery of the Government's overall Olympic and Paralympic Programme, is an invited member of NSID(PSR), a permanent member of ED(OPG) and reports direct to the Prime Minister;
- the **Home Secretary**, who is **lead minister** for Olympic and Paralympic safety and security, and is accountable for the delivery of a Safety and Security Strategy, Delivery Plans and the Safety and Security Programme.<sup>1</sup> The Home Secretary chairs NSID(PSR) and is a member of ED(OPG);
- the **Senior Responsible Owner** (SRO) for the Strategy, who will be responsible for its development and, through other agencies, departments and organisations, for its implementation, and who will be part of the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) in the Home Office;

<sup>1</sup> *This accountability does not override existing Ministerial statutory obligations, for example, those held by the **Secretary of State for Transport**, who is responsible for the security of UK transport systems and is empowered by legislation to require the regulated transport industry to implement security measures designed to protect its infrastructure, hardware, staff and the public using it from attack. Nor does it supplant other regulatory responsibilities for safety, for example the Health and Safety Executive's (HSE's) regulatory role in both construction and providing advice on major hazards.*

- the **Olympic and Paralympic Security Directorate** (OSD) within the OSCT, which will develop and manage the Strategy and its associated programmes and ensure their delivery through other agencies, departments and organisations and under the authority of the SRO;
  - the **Government Olympic Executive**, which is responsible for overseeing the delivery of the entire Olympic and Paralympic project, driving the public sector effort. It is accountable to Parliament and reports directly to the Minister for the Olympics;
  - the **London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games** (LOCOG), which is responsible for preparing and staging the 2012 Games, for the safety of spectators and the provision of routine safety and security measures as laid down in existing legislation; and
  - the **Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA)**, which is the public body responsible for developing and building the new venues and infrastructure for the Games, including designing in safety and security measures, in accordance with statutory requirements and risk-based judgements made in consultation with other security partners.
4. Shortly before the Games the **Assistant Commissioner in charge of the Olympics** in the **Metropolitan Police Service** will transfer to the role of the **National Olympic Security Co-ordinator**, and will oversee the operational delivery of the Safety and Security Strategy and concept of operations.

## Vision

5. The Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy shares the Olympic Board's overarching **vision** for the Olympic and Paralympic Games:

*To host an inspirational, safe and inclusive Olympic and Paralympic Games and leave a sustainable legacy for London and the UK.*

## Aim

6. The overall **aim** of the Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy is:

*To deliver a safe and secure Games, in keeping with the Olympic culture and spirit.*

7. In the context of this Strategy, 'safe' means the protection of people and property from hazards caused by non-malicious incidents. 'Secure' means the protection of people and property from threats caused by incidents and attacks of a malicious nature. The applicability of these definitions will be determined by the scope of this Strategy.

## Objectives

8. To achieve this aim we need to:

- **protect** Olympic and Paralympic venues, events and supporting transport infrastructure, and those attending and using them;
- **prepare** for events that may significantly disrupt the safety and security of the Games and ensure capabilities are in place to mitigate their impact;

- **identify and disrupt** threats to the safety and security of the Games;
- **command, control, plan and resource** the safety and security operation; and
- **engage** with international and domestic partners and communities to enhance our security and ensure the success of our Strategy.

9. A separate programme will be allocated to each of these objectives and together they will form the core of this Strategy. Further details of each of the programmes are given at paragraphs 46–50 below.

### Success criteria

10. Success will mean:

- **disrupting any attempt by terrorists or by organised criminality to target Games-related locations and infrastructure that fall within the scope of this Strategy;**
- **immediate and effective management of any incidents that threaten to significantly jeopardise Olympic and Paralympic safety and security;**
- **a safe and orderly experience for participants, spectators, workforce and officials; and**
- **the enhancement of the UK's international reputation for safety and security.**

### Scope

11. The scope of this Strategy will be defined by factors relating to time and place.

### Time

12. The Strategy will apply to the following phases:

- Phase 1 Design, plan and build:** lasting until the construction of venues and infrastructure is completed.
- Phase 2 Overlay and testing:** including the preparation of venues for use and live test events, **April 2011 – July 2012.**
- Phase 3 Games time:** the **64 days** from the opening of the Athletes' Village in **July 2012** to its close in **September 2012** plus the **Torch Relay**
- Phase 4 Recovery and decommissioning:** **September 2012 – 1 June 2013.**

### Place

13. The Strategy will apply to the following locations:

- **Competition Venues:** areas with a defined perimeter within which an Olympic or Paralympic competition will take place (e.g. the Velodrome, Olympic Stadium, Earls Court, marathon route).

- **Non-Competition Venues:** areas with a defined perimeter directly and significantly affected by the Games, or used for official LOCOG non-competition purposes. These will include cultural Olympiad events which are organised by LOCOG.
- **Training Venues:** defined areas where training sessions are held prior to and during the Games, managed by LOCOG.
- **Training Camps:** facilities where national Olympic or Paralympic teams train, having entered into an agreement with the owner (see paragraph 14 below).
- **Transport Networks:** where a significant proportion of usage is Olympics related, that carry spectators or Olympic Family to or away from an Olympic competition or non-competition venue.
- **Olympic Route Network:** a network of designated roads linking competition venues and key non-competition venues (e.g. accommodation and gateway arrival points into the UK).

### Scope: boundaries

14. The primary focus of this Strategy is on the geographical locations defined above, or critical supporting infrastructure for those venues and the events being held at them, across the four phases. This will be the focus of the additional investment. In relation to training camps, security will be the responsibility of the relevant national team and the owner of the facility. Where a specific and agreed risk assessment suggests it is necessary, additional support may be given.

15. In the context of this Strategy, safety encompasses the building of the Olympic venues and the placement of the overlay, for example, safety barriers, and the management of crowds within Olympic venues including those relevant aspects of the transport infrastructure and the management of crowds queuing to enter venues. Security encompasses the measures taken to mitigate the identified threats during the build, test, overlay and operational phases and the protection of persons using the venues in Games time, or queuing to enter them, and of the Games themselves.

16. Threats to locations outside Olympic venues will be managed within existing accountability frameworks and resources, and this Strategy is therefore connected to, and closely co-ordinated with, wider strategies including the national counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST,<sup>1</sup> which manage safety and security risks **throughout** the UK during the periods specified above, notably phases two and three. In this context the UK also means sea and air space. The Strategy will take within its scope responsibility for assessing the impact on the Games of these events, co-ordinating with those responsible for their handling and responding as required to meet the success criteria set out above.

### Risk

17. An Olympic Safety and Security Strategic Risk Assessment (OSSSRA) will underpin the delivery of this Strategy. The OSSSRA will evolve as understanding of risks unfolds and will inform strategic-level decision-making and the prioritisation of resources.

<sup>1</sup> [http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/general/HO\\_Contest\\_strategy.pdf](http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/general/HO_Contest_strategy.pdf)

18. In accordance with standard Cabinet Office methodology risk will be assessed on the basis of likelihood (reflecting threat and vulnerability) and impact. The OSSSRA will therefore include:

- **A strategic assessment of threats.** The Olympic Intelligence Centre has developed and will regularly update a Strategic Threat Assessment. This will cover all threats to the security of the Games including terrorism, domestic extremism, serious and organised crime and volume crime. This document will bring together assessments by existing agencies with responsibility for collecting intelligence.
- **An assessment of vulnerability.** The assessment of risk will also take into account the physical, personnel and electronic vulnerability of possible targets and, over time, measures to mitigate them.
- **An assessment of the impact.** This approach will draw on the standard approach used by the Cabinet Office for the National Risk Assessment (NRA): fatalities/casualties; disruption to essential services and infrastructure for the 2012 Games; psychological impact; and reputation.
- **An assessment of risk posed by hazards.** OSSSRA will also include an assessment of the threat, related vulnerability and impact of non-malicious hazards, including accidents, legitimate protest and industrial action.

## Threats

19. Threats to the Games will fall into the following categories:

- **Terrorism**
- **Serious Crime**
- **Domestic Extremism and Public Disorder**
- **Natural Hazards.**

## Other scope issues

20. In addition to the small number of cultural events that will be directly organised by LOCOG or other supporting and partner organisations, many local authorities and private event operators will seek to run parallel events. The nature and number of these events has yet to be scoped and may not be known for some considerable time.

## Planning principles

21. Planning for 2012 will be based on the following principles.

22. The Strategy, concept of operations, supporting plans and Programme will be delivered within existing statutory responsibilities (e.g. of first responder agencies as set out in the Civil Contingencies Act or of the tripartite structure that governs policing) and commercial frameworks (e.g. transport operating franchises). Wherever possible operational delivery will be based on standard operating procedures and processes.

23. This Strategy will be co-ordinated with the national counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST and with associated national and regional agency and policing plans for serious and volume crime.

24. In responding to the terrorist threat the Strategy will complement and make maximum use of existing national security and intelligence structures; the Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations (ACSO) will assume control of any Games-related investigations and/or counter-terrorism operations in accordance with the existing national counter-terrorism arrangements.

25. The Strategy and its associated programmes will be proportionate to and necessary for the management of key risks. It will need to preserve the 'look and feel' of the Games.

26. Intelligence will remain critical to the understanding of threats and the evaluation of risk. Safety and security planning and delivery will be intelligence-led and risk-based. This will inform the prioritisation of resources and the relative intensity of the security operation across the Olympic venues, locations and supporting infrastructure.

27. The success of this Strategy will depend on public support. This will require a strong focus on communications and community engagement, which should absorb lessons learned from counter terrorism and policing. This will include measures to raise public awareness and ensure co-operation, to manage expectations and to instil confidence.

28. The Strategy will require close co-operation with industry and the private security sector across a range of issues. Communicating the Strategy to these sectors, and providing a clear statement of co-ordinated and consistent capability requirements, will both be vital.

29. Technology and systems will have changed by 2012; within the timeframe allowed by the need to 'lock down' certain systems in advance of the Games, we will engage with industry in order to ensure that we use what is not only available, but also proven, reliable and effective, and that decisions are based on scientific and technical advice.

30. Where appropriate, the design and construction of Olympic venues and infrastructure will seek to 'design out' vulnerabilities. Additional physical security measures should be proportionate to the risk and should aim to reduce the resource requirement.

31. Non-security planning for the Games must take the Strategy into account. Agencies will need to develop protocols to allow the sharing of information on threats and on operational plans to make this possible. This will be managed through the Olympic Safety and Security Programme.

32. The Strategy will inform the management of events that are linked to and timed to coincide with the Games but are not formally within the scope outlined above. It will be vital to ensure that in terms of timing, scale and content these events meet the required security standards but do not cause unacceptable diversion of resources that would otherwise be devoted to the security and safety of the Games itself. This will be managed through the Olympic Safety and Security Programme.

33. The Strategy will seek to leave a lasting legacy of improved and effective partnership among UK security operators, a well motivated and developed workforce and an improved national security infrastructure and processes.

34. Key components within the Olympic Safety and Security Programme will be subject to an exercise and testing regime and, at appropriate intervals, to a process of external validation and peer review.

35. This Strategy, and the core principles enshrined within it, apply equally to the Paralympic Games. Planning for both should be concurrent and vary only where there are unique health and safety considerations.

36. This Strategy should be shared widely with all security stakeholders, and its core elements should form the basis of an integrated external communications strategy so that we continue to build and maintain public confidence in our security preparations.

### **Planning assumptions**

37. The following assumptions will guide our planning and will be used to develop future strategic direction. They may change over time, and will be carefully monitored and assessed for that reason.

38. There will be a clear focus on ensuring that the Games will go ahead in almost any circumstances.

39. The greatest threat to the security of the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games is international terrorism.

40. Security planning for the Games will be based on an assumed terrorist threat level of SEVERE. Where practical, security plans will be sufficient flexible and resilient to accommodate changes in threat level.

41. All delivery partners will make reasonable adjustments to 'business as usual' to accommodate the requirements of this Strategy.


42. Provision of security for the Olympic and Paralympic Games will be based on existing roles, functions and (where applicable) processes. Emergency services will maintain core service provision as defined in 2012, and the ability to respond to non-Olympic threats and hazards.

43. Planned increases in the levels of policing and emergency services capability and capacity will be achieved between now and 2012 and will be available for deployment. Any changes in planned levels of investment would need to be factored into security planning as appropriate.

44. In the event of any non-Olympic incident, i.e. an incident that is unlikely to have any impact on the Games or the infrastructure surrounding it, local resources will be expected to deal with it at that level utilising standard and current contingency plans.

### **Olympic and Paralympic safety and security programme structure**

45. The Safety and Security Programme will be structured using principles that have been developed for CONTEST: each strategic objective will be delivered through a programme led by a programme manager. The programme structure will correspond to the strategic objectives listed at paragraph 8. The number of projects will vary over time according to identified need. The existing projects will fit into the workstream structure as follows.



46. The **PROTECT** programme will deliver measures to protect the people, venues and infrastructure involved in the Games. It will include the protection of Olympics-related sites and venues; the protection of large numbers of people travelling to the Games and other infrastructure critical to the delivery of the Games; and the protection of VIPs, Olympic teams and other individuals judged to be at risk. It will also address personnel security (including identity assurance); the additional burdens on the UK's border security during the Games period; and protection against Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive attack (CBRNE). It will establish a system to test protective security as part of the assurance process.

47. The **PREPARE** programme will ensure that capabilities and contingencies are in place to manage events which may significantly disrupt or compromise the safety and security of the Games. This programme will cover specialist planning for a terrorist incident and the capabilities required for dealing with it or mitigating the threat. It also includes wider resilience planning specific to the Olympic and Paralympic Games. Delivering that response and capabilities during the Games will be determined in conjunction with other workstreams.

48. The **IDENTIFY and DISRUPT** programme will ensure that threats to the Games are quickly and effectively identified and, where possible, disrupted.

It will be delivered through appropriate, proportionate and lawful use of overt and covert law enforcement and security and intelligence agency resources. This programme will also include the collection, collation and dissemination of intelligence and open source material on threats to the Games from terrorism, serious and organised crime, public order issues, volume crime and community tensions. This programme will identify and deliver any additional resources and equipment needed for covert operations.

49. The **COMMAND, CONTROL, PLAN and RESOURCE** programme will ensure that the human resources necessary to deliver a safe and secure Games are identified, trained and made ready and available. It will plan, procure and test the logistical requirements to marshal and deploy these resources and define how they will be managed. It will create systems and structures for national co-ordination enabling the delivery of the Strategy.

50. The **ENGAGE** programme will ensure that Olympic and Paralympic Family members and the wider national and international community understand and have confidence in the Strategy; specific security requirements of participants have been addressed; key stakeholders in the UK (including the private sector) understand and support the Strategy; and communities, especially those living in the neighbourhood of Olympic venues, are informed and involved. This programme will connect to the Prevent strand of CONTEST, the objective of which is to deter communities from supporting or participating in terrorism; it will apply that programme to the specific context of the Olympics.

## Strategic governance

51. The **Olympic Board** is chaired by the Minister for the Olympics and the Mayor of London. It provides oversight, strategic co-ordination and monitoring of the entire 2012 Games project, ensuring the delivery of the commitments made to the International Olympic Committee when the Games were awarded to London, and a sustainable legacy from the staging of the Games.

52. The **Olympic Security Board (OSB)** chaired by the SRO will provide collective senior official ownership and oversight of the Strategy and its associated plans and of the residual risks. It will report to NSID(PSR) and will keep the Olympic Board informed, which oversees the Games and their legacy as a whole.

53. The OSB will agree which organisations will lead specified areas of work, indicative budgets and timescales and common standards. The Olympic Investment Appraisal and Monitoring Board (OIAMB) will ensure that individual projects are in a fit state to proceed and authorise funding. Should a project exceed the budget (including tolerances) set out in its commission it will be for the OSB to decide how to proceed, on the advice of OIAMB. On the recommendation of OIAMB and the SRO the OSB will decide whether to recommend to Ministers that a call be made on contingency funds for Olympic security.

54. The OSB will ensure that the agreed level of protection provided for the Games continues to be maintained as threats develop or change. In response to any change to the threat assessment to the Games, the OSB will provide to NSID(PSR) a range of options in response.

55. Final decisions on what level of residual risk will be accepted will be for Ministers via NSID(PSR) and ED(OPG), based on collective senior official advice provided through the OSB.

56. The OSB will include those responsible for:

- delivery of major components of the Programme;
- funding for major components of the Programme, including changes to funding as the Programme proceeds;
- delivering other components of the Games which have a major dependency on its security and safety; and
- assessing or recommending the impact of changes (for example a change in threat assessment).

57. The Government Olympic Executive is currently leading discussion about how best to ensure the effective integration of Olympic programmes. Until other frameworks are in place, governance of security and non-security programmes for the 2012 Games will come together at ministerial level through ED(OPG) which is responsible for co-ordinating and overseeing issues relating to the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games.

## Roles and responsibilities

### For Strategy and Programme

58. This section sets out the roles and responsibilities of key security partners in so far as they relate to the Strategy and Programme through to the operational delivery of the Olympic and Paralympic Games.

59. The **Home Office**, on behalf of the Home Secretary, will lead the development and delivery of an Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy and associated plans and programmes.

### Senior Responsible Owner

60. Within the Home Office the **SRO** will be responsible for developing, co-ordinating and (through other agencies, departments and organisations) delivering the Strategy. The SRO will provide assurance to the Home Secretary that the operational plans developed for the Games are fit for purpose. The SRO will **not** assume command of the Games-time safety and security operation. He/she will:

- be responsible for managing the programme finances within the agreed funding envelope. However, where other departments are funding activity, the departments' respective accounting officers retain their individual responsibilities; and
- ensure that the Strategy is externally reviewed at key decision points and that any recommendations are acted on.

### Olympic and Paralympic Security Directorate

61. The SRO will lead the **OSD**, part of the **OSCT** in the Home Office.

62. The OSD will:

- manage the Strategy and Programme and ensure delivery by commissioning work to lead agencies. It will ensure integration with the programmes of LOCOG and ODA, set and enforce standards, provide support to projects, monitor progress, manage strategic, operational and programme risks and dependencies, and ensure compliance;



- deliver those limited projects identified as having no clearly identifiable lead agency;
- manage the funding allocated to Olympic security and ensure that new projects go through an investment appraisal process; and
- connect this Strategy to non-national Olympic safety and security plans, ensuring consistency and co-ordination.

### For delivery

#### The Olympic Delivery Authority

63. The **ODA** is the public body established by the London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Act 2006 to develop and build the new venues and infrastructure for the Olympic and Paralympic Games and for converting them for use post-2012. As a public body, the ODA is accountable to Government for its work.

64. In this Strategy the ODA is responsible for:

- applying appropriate security measures (including Secured by Design principles) to the design and build of venues and infrastructure;
- securing ODA workplace and construction sites;
- delivering specific security infrastructure for the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games;
- contributing to the delivery of a robust, safe and secure transport system; and
- ensuring that the security and integrity of newly built venues, whether temporary or permanent, is maintained until handover to LOCOG.

#### The London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games (LOCOG)

65. **LOCOG** is a private company limited by guarantee and financed almost exclusively from private funds. It was established under a Joint Venture Guarantee by the Government, Greater London Authority and British Olympic Association to prepare for and stage the 2012 Games. Its primary responsibility is for the 64 days during which the Olympic and Paralympic Games occur. Its broad responsibilities include:

- providing a single point of contact to the International Olympic Committee, the International Paralympic Committee, National Olympic Committees and international sporting federations;
- staging a series of test events in the year before the games; and
- developing and managing operational plans for the Games, including media aspects, ticketing, sponsorship activities and accreditation.

66. LOCOG also has specific responsibilities in relation to the security operation at Games time.

#### Department for Transport

67. The Department for Transport will ensure that elements of the Olympic safety and security operation that deal with the transport network take account of any complex regulatory and contractual issues that require close engagement with industry. It is responsible for the security of UK transport systems and is empowered by legislation to require the regulated transport industries to implement security measures designed to protect their infrastructure, their hardware, staff and the public using it from attack.

### The Mayor of London

68. The Mayor of London is co-chair of the Olympic Board, which co-ordinates the overall delivery of the 2012 Games and their legacy, and (with LOCOG and the British Olympic Association) is signatory to the Host City Contract with the International Olympic Committee. He contributes to the public sector funding package for the Games, and attends meetings of Cabinet Committees ED(OPG) and NSID(PSR). The Mayor also co-ordinates, on behalf of London 2012, the City Operations Programme, which seeks to ensure the continuity of public services, and to meet the extraordinary demands placed on London outside of LOCOG venues, in Games time.

### The Emergency Services

69. The emergency services (police forces, the fire and rescue service, and the ambulance service) will have specific responsibilities for safety and security during the Olympic and Paralympic Games, consistent with existing statutory and common law obligations.

### The Association of Chief Police Officers

70. The Association of Chief Police Officers will, through the Police National Information and Co-ordination Centre (PNICC), support the security operation through the Police National Mobilisation Plan by co-ordinating and prioritising Games-time requests for additional police resources.

### Local Authorities

71. Local authorities will be responsible:

- with and through the Local Resilience Forums, for ensuring that Games-related risk assessments have been completed and that suitable and appropriate emergency and business continuity plans have been put into place;

- for issuing safety certificates for public events relating to the Olympics; and
- for managing local areas and local needs to an appropriate standard to ensure that the core Olympic Games objectives are met and in accordance with policing needs.

### Police Authorities

72. Police authorities, including the Metropolitan Police Authority, have a statutory obligation (Section 6(1) of the Police Act 1996) to 'secure the maintenance of an efficient and effective police force for its area'. In the context of the Olympic and Paralympic Games this includes legacy and community engagement and ensuring that the delivery of core policing is not compromised.

### UK Border Agency

73. The UK Border Agency is responsible for ensuring border security and compliance with immigration legislation, including facilitating entry and exit to and from the UK and ensuring that only workers with lawful status are able to access jobs.

## Operational Command, Control and Co-ordination

74. During the Games, the safety and security operation will comprise a series of locally commanded but nationally co-ordinated operations.

75. Ministers and officials sitting in the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR) will monitor the overall delivery of the Games, including the implementation of the Strategy. They will be consulted when there is a specific malicious or non-malicious threat to the Games or a threat elsewhere likely to impact on the Games; and in particular where that threat poses a risk to the Games schedule.

76. COBR will work closely with the dedicated National Olympic Security Co-ordinator (NOSC) and with the Assistant Commissioner for Specialist Operations (ACSO) in the Metropolitan Police on terrorism-related issues. It will also maintain dialogue with the LOCOG Main Operating Centre (MOC). The NOSC will be supported by a National Olympic Co-ordination Centre (NOCC) through which links will be maintained with Gold Commanders, ACSO, the National Counter Terrorist Investigator and, where appropriate, Strategic Co-ordination Centres. Further details will be set out in the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic National Concept of Operations, and through the Command, Control, Plan and Resource programme.

### **Costs**

77. In March 2007 Ministers agreed an indicative funding envelope to cover the additional costs of this Strategy, including a contingency that will only be called on in the event of a material change in circumstances. These figures do not include expenditure on safety and security by the ODA and LOCOG.

78. In accordance with principles established by HM Treasury, each department will be responsible for agreeing, funding and monitoring the additional costs of those agencies and bodies for which it is the sponsor. Additional costs mean costs which give rise to additional expenditure by the taxpayer.

79. Some agencies may also be required to divert part of their existing activity and budgets to Olympic security. Since doing so does not give rise to additional taxpayer expenditure, these are classed as opportunity costs and are not counted within the funding envelope. Work is ongoing with agencies to understand the extent of these costs and agree how they can best be managed.

### **Financial controls**

80. In accordance with the principle that each department is responsible for the proper management of the money voted to it by Parliament, each responsible department will put in place mechanisms for deciding whether to allocate funds for particular projects. Additional funding will only be released on production of a detailed business case which sets out what the proposed expenditure is designed to achieve and how it will mitigate identified risks. Business cases will also need to demonstrate that any procurement involved is being undertaken as efficiently and economically as possible. Affordability will also need to be considered.

81. The OSB will ensure that there is collective responsibility for delivering the Programme within the agreed funding envelope.



